Early 1990s — Enimont / Mani Pulite (Tangentopoli)

What: Enimont (a joint venture involving state-owned Eni and Montedison) became a central focus of the wide-ranging Italian “Mani Pulite” (Clean Hands / Tangentopoli) corruption investigations. Executives and political figures were implicated in kickbacks and illicit payments linked to Enimont privatizations and contracts (the Cusani trial is the best-known episode).
Why it matters: One of the earliest public scandals linking Eni-related deals to political payoffs during Italy’s major 1990s corruption sweep. Wikipedia

2007–2010 (revealed later) — Algeria / Sham-contract scheme (Saipem/Algeria)

What: Investigations found that Saipem (then majority-controlled by Eni) used “sham contracts” and intermediaries to obtain Algerian state contracts. The U.S. SEC later concluded accounting/books-and-records violations and identified suspicious payments through intermediaries.
Outcome: In April 2020 Eni agreed to settle with the SEC (paid/consented order) over FCPA-related accounting issues tied to Algeria (Eni did not admit or deny findings). Parallel Italian proceedings produced mixed outcomes for Saipem and individuals. SEC+1

April 29, 2011 — OPL 245 deal (Nigeria) — payment placed in escrow

What: A $1.3 billion package (including a $1.092bn payment placed in escrow) relating to the OPL 245 Nigerian oilfield was agreed — later central to allegations that payments benefitted intermediaries and corrupt actors rather than the Nigerian people. Shell and Eni were the main buyers. Reuters+1

2016–2019 — OPL 245 investigations and 2018 fast-track convictions for two middlemen

What: Italian prosecutors opened criminal cases examining whether the 2011 OPL 245 transaction involved bribery. In a 2018 fast-track trial two middlemen were convicted (4-year sentences) though those convictions were later quashed on appeal. Eni and Shell executives were prosecuted in Italy in a long-running case. Wikipedia+1

17 March 2021 — Milan court: Eni & Shell acquitted (OPL 245)

What / Outcome: After a multi-year trial, the Milan Tribunal acquitted Eni, Shell and the other defendants, finding “no case to answer.” The appeals and related civil claims continued for some time afterwards. Wikipedia

2020–2021 — US DOJ & SEC actions / closures and SEC settlement (April 2020)

What: By 2019–2020 the U.S. Department of Justice closed certain probes; in April 2020 the SEC issued an order and Eni reached a $24.5m settlement to resolve alleged FCPA books-and-records issues (Eni did not admit or deny SEC findings). Eni publicly announced the SEC and DOJ closures. Eni+1

2021–2023 — OPL 245 civil actions and appeals (final steps)

What: Civil claims by Nigeria and related appeals continued after the criminal acquittals. In November 2022 an Italian court rejected Nigeria’s $1.092bn civil claim against Eni and Shell; by late 2023 Nigeria indicated withdrawal of remaining actions, substantially winding down the long dispute. (Multiple judicial steps occurred over these years.) Wikipedia

October 2024 — Conviction of two Milan prosecutors for withholding evidence (linked to OPL 245)

What / Outcome: A Brescia court convicted two Milan prosecutors (Fabio De Pasquale and Sergio Spadaro) of withholding exculpatory material during the OPL 245 trial and handed suspended sentences — an unusual development that concerned watchdogs and highlighted divisions in the prosecution of major corruption cases. (Their convictions were later subject to appeal/uphold decisions in 2025.) Wikipedia+1

2024–2025 — Appeals upholding convictions of prosecutors (ENI-related case fallout)

What: Italian appeals courts in 2025 upheld convictions/sentences for the two prosecutors for withholding evidence in the OPL 245 matter — a development widely reported because it affects trust in major anti-corruption investigations. Reuters+1

2023 — Climate lawsuit & reputational controversies (greenwashing / early knowledge)

What: Environmental groups (e.g., Greenpeace Italy, ReCommon) filed climate-related litigation accusing Eni of misleading the public and lobbying/greenwashing while allegedly knowing about climate risks historically. This is a reputational/legal pressure that sits alongside corruption scandals in public perception. The Guardian

2025 (March) — Probe after fuel-depot explosion near Florence

What: Prosecutors opened investigations into Eni and several employees after a December fuel-depot explosion that caused fatalities; prosecutors allege possible negligence and corporate responsibility failures. While this is a safety/criminal probe (not classic corruption), it’s a recent scandal and legal issue involving Eni. Reuters

Quick summary / takeaways

Big recurring theme: cross-border intermediaries, complex escrow/payments (OPL 245), and use of third-party contractors/intermediaries (Algeria/Saipem) — these show up repeatedly in the most serious allegations. Reuters+1
Mixed legal outcomes: some high-profile acquittals (e.g., Eni’s 2021 acquittal in Milan on OPL 245), while other actors (middlemen, Saipem in parts, and — notably — two prosecutors) faced convictions at different stages. Investigations by U.S. authorities ended with an SEC settlement in 2020; DOJ publicly closed some probes. Wikipedia+2Eni+2

Second Question: Has there been any criminal charges against ENI? Any links with criminal organisations?

Good questions, Axel. The short answer: yes — there have been criminal charges, investigations, and convictions in relation to Eni (or its group/subsidiaries) — at least in some associated companies or managers. But broad “convicted corruption as Eni” has often ended in acquittals. As for credible, proven links with organised-crime/mob-type criminal organisations: I found no definitive public court verdict that establishes Eni itself as a member or instrument of a mafia-type organisation — the allegations tend to revolve around bribery, corruption or mis-management, not proven mafia-style criminal association. Below are the main facts and grey zones.

What is known — Criminal charges, convictions, prosecutions against Eni / related

In the “Algeria case” (contracts through its subsidiary Saipem between ~2007–2010), Saipem admitted to corruption: an Italian court in 2018 convicted former Saipem CEO Pietro Tali and others, sentencing them to ~4 years 9 months, and seized ~€197 million. Hart Energy+2The Local Italy+2
In that same case the court acquitted Eni, its former CEO Paolo Scaroni and a senior manager, finding insufficient proof of wrongdoing on their part. Hart Energy+2The Local Italy+2
In the 2011-field acquisition in Nigeria (the OPL‑245 bribery affair), in 2017 prosecutors indicted 13 individuals and companies (including Eni and its then-executives). Wikipedia+2Hart Energy+2
The trial started in May 2018. Prosecutors argued that ~US$1.1 billion had been paid to corrupt Nigerian officials to secure the oil‐field licence. Wikipedia+2Hart Energy+2
However in March 2021 a Milan court acquitted Eni, its executives (including the then-CEO Claudio Descalzi) and Shell, ruling there was “no case to answer.” Wikipedia+2Wikipedia+2
The closure included also the decision by the U.S. authorities (United States Department of Justice — DOJ) not to further pursue the investigation. Eni+2Transparency International Nederland+2
Additionally, the U.S. securities regulator (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission — SEC) settled with Eni in 2020 for alleged “books-and-records” violations in relation to its Algerian / African operations. Eni paid about US$24.5 million; it did not admit wrongdoing. ICIJ+2Paul, Weiss+2

In short: yes — there have been criminal proceedings, some resulted in convictions (but often against a subsidiary, or former employees, not the parent company directly), many ended in acquittals (for Eni or its top management).

What is not established — No proven “mafia-style” links or structural ties with organised crime

I found no credible public, court-approved verdict that designates Eni (or its executives) as part of a mafia-type criminal association. The legal cases focus on bribery, corruption, accounting fraud — not on criminal-organisation membership.
Allegations of “links to organised crime” for Eni seem to come mostly from investigative or polemic articles (often more speculative or journalistic), but lack the judicial proof or verdicts that meet legal standards. For example, I saw no record of a court convicting Eni under laws that require “association with criminal organisations.”
Some articles claim that past eras of Italian corruption (for example under the broader system around state-owned companies) may have had “tangled” overlaps with secretive groups or “networks” — but such claims remain controversial and generally unproven for Eni. Unitesi+2eurojournalist.eu+2

Why the picture is messy / ambiguous

Many cases are structurally complex: cross-border contracts, shell companies, intermediaries, “third-party” contractors — this complexity makes it very difficult for prosecutors to prove who exactly committed the offence and for whose benefit.
Even when there was a conviction (e.g. Saipem), the court may acquit the holding company (Eni) if it judges there was no sufficient internal knowledge or direction from top management. That’s what has happened more than once.
Charges sometimes rest on “accounting / books-and-records” violations (especially in overseas operations), which are easier to “settle” (e.g. via SEC settlement) without admission of guilt — hence there may be no final criminal conviction even when regulators impose financial penalties.

My Conclusion — What we can say (and what remains uncertain)

We can say with confidence that there have been criminal charges and even convictions connected to Eni’s operations — though often against its subsidiaries (Saipem) or individual middle-managers, not always against Eni as a whole.
We cannot say that Eni is definitively “linked” to organised crime (e.g. mafia). There is no public, confirmed legal judgment that classifies Eni or its executives as part of a criminal syndicate.
Therefore, while Eni has — by its own history — been in repeated legal danger because of corruption allegations, the claim that it functions as a “mob-style criminal network” lacks firm judicial evidence (at least publicly).

Eni: Allegations, Proven Facts, and the Question of Criminal Networks

Over the past three decades, Eni and parts of its corporate group have repeatedly been drawn into major international corruption investigations. While these cases have produced a complex mixture of allegations, prosecutions, acquittals, and in some instances convictions, the overall judicial record is more nuanced than many public narratives suggest.

The best-documented corruption episode involves Saipem, formerly controlled by Eni, in connection with contracts in Algeria between 2007 and 2010. Prosecutors alleged that Saipem used intermediaries and inflated invoices to funnel illicit payments in order to secure large deals with the Algerian state oil company, Sonatrach. In 2018, a Milan court convicted former Saipem CEO Pietro Tali and several managers, and imposed significant penalties on the company. However, Eni itself — along with certain senior Eni executives — was acquitted, with judges concluding that the evidence did not establish direct involvement by the parent company.

Eni became even more widely known for its role in the controversial OPL 245 oilfield acquisition in Nigeria. Investigators and NGOs argued for years that the US$1.1 billion paid in the 2011 deal was largely diverted to middlemen and corrupt Nigerian officials. The case resulted in one of Europe’s most high-profile corporate corruption trials, with criminal charges brought in Italy against Eni, Shell, and several senior executives. After a lengthy process, the Milan court ruled in March 2021 that there was “no case to answer”, acquitting all defendants. Earlier convictions against two intermediaries, obtained in a fast-track procedure, were later overturned on appeal. The complexity of the OPL 245 affair did not end there: in 2024 and 2025, two Milan prosecutors were themselves convicted in Brescia for withholding exculpatory evidence during the OPL 245 trial — a development that cast further doubt on parts of the original prosecution strategy.

Beyond these headline cases, Eni has also faced regulatory action. In 2020, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reached a settlement with the company over “books-and-records” violations connected to activities in Africa, particularly the Algerian business. The settlement, which Eni agreed to without admitting wrongdoing, resulted in financial penalties but did not involve criminal charges. The U.S. Department of Justice separately closed related inquiries without pursuing further prosecution.

Environmental and operational issues have also triggered criminal investigations in Italy, especially in regions where Eni operates large energy facilities. Some of these probes were led by anti-mafia prosecutors due to Italy’s legal structure, which assigns environmental, waste-handling or public-contract cases to specialised units. While these investigations have occasionally resulted in arrests or charges against managers, they have not produced any final ruling linking Eni as a corporation to mafia-type criminal organisations.

This distinction is critical. Although media commentary and investigative reporting sometimes speculate about “mafia-style networks” surrounding Italy’s state-linked industries, there is no judicial decision establishing that Eni or its leadership participated in, or knowingly collaborated with, a criminal organisation in the legal sense. The confirmed facts concern corruption, bribery schemes, or regulatory failures — primarily involving subsidiaries or individuals — rather than organised-crime association.

In sum, Eni’s legal history is marked by serious corruption allegations, several criminal investigations, a few convictions involving subsidiaries or managers, and many high-profile cases that ultimately ended in acquittal. While suspicions and controversies continue to circulate, particularly given the complexity of international energy deals, the existing public record does not support claims that Eni has been legally proven to operate as part of a criminal network.