In 2020, Novamont reportedly revalued its intangible assets by €534 million, dramatically strengthening its balance sheet. Yet the Italian bioplastics pioneer subsequently recorded substantial financial losses, including approximately €70 million in 2025. Following Eni’s takeover, questions remain about the value of Novamont’s patents, trademarks and technology. Who justified the original revaluation, why has profitability remained elusive, and who ultimately benefited?
In 2020, Italian bioplastics producer Novamont reportedly increased the accounting value of its intangible assets by approximately €534 million.
Three years later, the company was fully acquired by Eni through its chemical subsidiary, Versalis. Soon afterwards, Reuters reported that Novamont could be valued at approximately €1 billion, including debt.
By 2025, however, Novamont was still struggling financially, with reported annual losses of approximately €70 million.
This sequence raises an important question: How were Novamont’s patents and trademarks valued, and what role did those valuations play in the company’s subsequent financial transactions?
The answer is not straightforward. The figures come from different accounting exercises, conducted for different purposes. But official Versalis financial statements establish a significant connection between Novamont’s 2020 revaluation and later valuations undertaken during changes in its ownership.
The investigation also encounters a documentary obstacle: the complete original 2020 Novamont financial statements, including the statutory auditors’ report and any underlying independent valuation reports, have not yet been obtained directly by Bioplastics News.
That distinction matters. The following examination identifies what the available documents establish, what a separate financial analysis claims, and what remains unanswered.
1. The €534 Million Revaluation That Changed Novamont’s Balance Sheet
The story begins with an Italian law introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Article 110 of Decree-Law 104/2020 allowed qualifying Italian companies to revalue certain business assets in their statutory accounts. Companies could also obtain recognition of higher values for tax purposes by paying a substitute tax of 3%, subject to the applicable conditions.
The measure provided businesses with an opportunity to strengthen their reported balance sheets and potentially generate future tax deductions.
According to a ten-page financial analysis dated November 6, 2023, entitled Novamont S.p.A. e i suoi bilanci, storia di un naufragio nel porto sicuro di Eni/Versalis, Novamont used the legislation to revalue assets by a total of €579,747,434.
The analysis attributes the following figures to Novamont’s 2020 statutory accounts:
| Asset category | Reported revaluation |
|---|---|
| Industrial patents and related intellectual property rights | €427.82 million |
| Trademarks, licenses and similar rights | €106.22 million |
| Total intangible assets | €534.04 million |
| Buildings, machinery and other tangible assets | €45.71 million |
| Total asset revaluation | €579.75 million |
These figures describe increases in accounting values, not cash received, not the market price of the company and not necessarily the closing book value of each asset category.
The same analysis reports that Novamont created a revaluation reserve of approximately €562.36 million after accounting for a substitute tax of €17.39 million.
It also states that Novamont S.p.A.’s shareholders’ equity rose from approximately €116.22 million in 2019 to €711.46 million in 2020.
If confirmed against the original accounts, that would represent an extraordinary transformation of the company’s reported financial position in a single year.
But it would not mean Novamont had generated hundreds of millions of euros in new operating cash. An asset revaluation changes accounting measurements; it does not, by itself, create money in the bank.
Nor does a higher book value automatically establish that an asset could be sold for the same amount.
For a company whose value rests partly on patented materials, production processes, trademarks and technical know-how, the distinction is fundamental.
2. Who Valued Novamont’s Patents and Trademarks?
This is where the investigation becomes particularly interesting.
The November 2023 analysis reproduces a passage that it attributes to Novamont’s 2020 statutory auditors’ report, known in Italy as the Relazione del Collegio Sindacale.
According to that secondary document, the statutory auditors stated that management determined the revaluation using values at December 31, 2020, supported by valuation reports prepared by independent third parties.
The relevant Italian wording is:
“confortati da apposite perizie di stima redatte da terzi indipendenti.”
The analysis identifies the passage as appearing on pages 4–5 of the statutory auditors’ report, corresponding to pages 258–259 of the complete financial filing.
It separately quotes what it presents as a passage from Novamont’s notes to the accounts, referring to a valuation prepared by an independent professional in connection with patents.
These are specific, traceable references.
But Bioplastics News has not yet independently examined the original filings or the underlying valuation reports. Their contents must therefore be treated as attributed quotations rather than independently verified primary-source evidence.
Several questions follow.
Who prepared the valuations? Were different professionals responsible for patents, trademarks and industrial assets? What methodologies did they use?
Did the estimates depend primarily on historical earnings, projected future revenues, expected royalties, technological advantages or other assumptions?
And how sensitive were the valuations to changes in market demand, production costs, competition and profitability?
Italian law did not generally require companies using the 2020 revaluation regime to commission and publicly file an independent valuation report. That point is important: the absence of a publicly available valuation report would not, by itself, establish noncompliance.
However, if the official statutory auditors’ report really refers to valuations prepared by independent third parties, those reports become central to understanding how management justified the revaluation.
The identity of the valuers, their instructions and their assumptions are therefore legitimate matters for further investigation.
3. The Tax Question: What Did Novamont Gain?
The revaluation also had a potentially significant tax dimension.
Under Article 110, qualifying companies could elect tax recognition of higher asset values through a 3% substitute tax.
For Novamont, the November 2023 analysis reports an associated substitute tax of approximately €17.39 million.
In principle, tax-recognized increases in depreciable or amortizable asset values can generate deductions over subsequent years.
That can be financially valuable. But the actual benefit depends on the type of asset, the applicable recovery period, the company’s taxable profits, subsequent legislative changes and the accounting treatment adopted.
Those qualifications are especially relevant here.
In December 2021, Italy changed the rules for certain revalued intangible assets, including trademarks, extending their tax-deduction period from 18 years to at least 50 years unless specified alternative options were exercised.
This substantially altered the timing of potential deductions.
A supplementary technical analysis supplied to Bioplastics News also raises questions about Novamont’s deferred tax assets and their subsequent treatment. It refers to approximately €149 million in deferred tax assets and suggests that the annual reversal pattern warrants examination.
However, the analysis does not establish whether Novamont exercised the alternative tax options, how all relevant assets were treated, or what tax benefits ultimately materialized.
Those questions cannot responsibly be answered by simply multiplying the 2020 revaluation by a standard corporate tax rate.
A theoretical tax benefit is not the same as an actual tax saving.
The original statutory accounts and subsequent tax-related disclosures are necessary to determine how much of the revaluation’s potential benefit was ultimately realized.
Novamont’s Financial Timeline: 2019–2025
The following timeline combines the figures attributed to the 2020 Novamont accounts with independently available Versalis, Eni and Reuters disclosures. It does not represent a continuous series of year-end intangible-asset balances, which remains to be reconstructed from the original accounts.
| Year | Financial development |
|---|---|
| 2019 | The November 2023 analysis reports Novamont S.p.A. shareholders’ equity of approximately €116.22 million, before the subsequent revaluation. |
| 2020 | Reported asset revaluation of €579.75 million, including €534.04 million in intangible assets. Reported year-end equity rises to approximately €711.46 million. |
| 2021 | The 2020 accounts are considered by shareholders. The subsequent legislative change lengthens tax-deduction periods for certain revalued intangibles. The asset-by-asset closing balances remain to be verified. |
| 2022 | Versalis and Novamont settle the Matrìca arbitration. Versalis increases its Novamont stake from 25% to 35% and records approximately €172 million in additional intangible values in its transaction accounting. |
| 2023 | Versalis completes the acquisition of the remaining 64% of Novamont for €404 million. Reuters reports a possible Novamont valuation of approximately €1 billion in connection with potential minority investment. |
| 2024 | Versalis finalizes the acquisition’s purchase price allocation, identifying approximately €475 million of additional intangible values. Reuters again reports a possible €1 billion enterprise valuation, including debt. |
| 2025 | Eni reports €271 million in Novamont-related revenue and a 7.4% reduction in sales volumes. Bioplastics News has separately reported a Novamont net loss of approximately €70 million. |
The timeline reveals a succession of major valuation and ownership events. It does not, on its own, demonstrate that any transaction was improper.
4. The 2022 Matrìca Arbitration: A Financial Connection Confirmed by Versalis
Before Eni obtained full ownership, Novamont and Versalis had already been involved in a significant corporate dispute.
The disagreement concerned Matrìca, their joint venture in Porto Torres, Sardinia, established to develop renewable chemical products.
In March 2022, the parties concluded a settlement that ended the arbitration.
According to Versalis’s official 2022 consolidated financial statements, Novamont recognized a debt relating to contributions that Versalis had made to Matrìca. As part of the settlement arrangements, Versalis increased its ownership of Novamont from 25% to 35%.
Versalis recognized the additional 10% stake at a fair value of approximately €88 million. It also recorded a €37 million adjustment to the value of its previously held interest.
But the most significant detail for this investigation appears in the same financial statements.
Versalis disclosed that its transaction-related purchase price allocation attributed approximately €172 million of additional value to intangible assets, specifically trademarks and patents, together with approximately €65 million in goodwill.
Crucially, Versalis stated that recognizing those additional values was consistent with the revaluation undertaken by Novamont under Decree-Law 104/2020.
That is a direct reference in an official corporate filing.
It confirms that the earlier revaluation was relevant to the valuation discussion surrounding the 2022 transaction.
However, the €172 million was not simply another €172 million added to Novamont’s own 2020 revaluation. It was a measurement made within Versalis’s accounting for its investment, reflecting the accounting requirements applicable to that transaction.
The figures must not be added together as if they were independent increases in the same balance sheet.
The disclosure nevertheless raises a legitimate investigative question:
What valuation evidence did Versalis rely upon when it concluded that its additional patent and trademark values were consistent with Novamont’s earlier revaluation?
The available financial statements establish the connection. They do not establish that the two accounting exercises used identical methods or that either relied on the same independent experts.
5. The 2023 Takeover: Who Benefited Financially?
On October 18, 2023, Versalis completed its purchase of the remaining 64% of Novamont, obtaining full control.
The seller was Mater-Bi, a company controlled by financial investors associated with Investitori Associati II and NB Renaissance.
Eni and Versalis subsequently disclosed consideration of approximately €404 million for that remaining stake.
For acquisition accounting under IFRS 3, Versalis also attributed a fair value of €227 million to its previously held 36% interest.
Together, those figures produced a €631 million accounting consideration for 100% of Novamont’s equity.
That figure is different from the €404 million paid for the remaining stake, and different again from an enterprise valuation that includes debt.
Eni also disclosed approximately €207 million in net financial liabilities associated with Novamont at acquisition.
The takeover established a financial outcome for the selling shareholders: they disposed of their remaining interest and received the contractual consideration.
But the fact that a transaction took place after the 2020 revaluation does not establish that the revaluation determined the price.
The acquisition agreement, negotiated expectations, due diligence and independent assessments, if any, would be needed to determine how the purchase consideration was reached.
The 2024 Accounts: A Second Look at the Intangible Assets
There is, however, another unusually revealing disclosure.
In its 2024 consolidated annual report, Versalis published the finalized purchase price allocation for the acquisition of Novamont.
The allocation identified the following additional asset values:
| Category | Finalized acquisition accounting |
|---|---|
| Patents | €251 million |
| Trademarks | €153 million |
| Licenses and authorizations | €51 million |
| Customer relationships | €20 million |
| Total identified intangible adjustments | €475 million |
The report also identified approximately €133 million in associated deferred tax liabilities and approximately €24 million in residual goodwill.
These are acquisition-date fair-value adjustments, not necessarily the total book values of Novamont’s patents and trademarks in 2024.
That distinction prevents a direct claim that €534 million in 2020 had somehow become €475 million in 2024.
Nevertheless, the figures are important.
In 2020, Novamont reportedly revalued its own intangible assets under a specific Italian statutory accounting regime.
In 2022, Versalis recognized additional intangible values in accounting for its increased investment.
In 2023–2024, Versalis undertook and finalized a further allocation following its acquisition of control.
Three different exercises. Three different purposes. Yet the economic assets at the heart of the calculations—patents, trademarks and technology—overlap.
A properly documented reconciliation of those valuations would considerably improve public understanding of the transaction.
6. The Billion-Euro Question: What Was Novamont Really Worth?
Then comes the Reuters reporting.
On December 15, 2023, Reuters reported that Eni was exploring a minority stake sale in Novamont in a possible transaction valuing the company at approximately €1 billion.
The report cited a source close to the matter and identified HitecVision and Blackstone as among the interested investors.
On April 15, 2024, Reuters again reported that Eni was in talks with potential investors about selling up to 30% of Novamont, in a transaction that could value the business at approximately €1 billion, including debt.
This was not an independent appraisal published by Reuters, nor a confirmed transaction price. It was a potential valuation reported from transaction-related sources.
Even so, the figure deserves attention.
Versalis had paid €404 million for the remaining 64% of Novamont only months earlier. The company was also confronting difficult market conditions and had recorded substantial losses.
Why, then, was a possible €1 billion valuation circulating?
One explanation is that investors might have assigned significant strategic value to Novamont’s patents, established market position, international operations, production facilities and future growth opportunities.
Another is that the figure reflected an indicative negotiating valuation rather than a price any investor had agreed to pay.
Both possibilities are commercially plausible.
Eni was following a broader strategy of attracting specialist investors into selected businesses through its so-called satellite model. Novamont was a potential candidate.
But a potential valuation and an agreed market price are not interchangeable.
There is also a noteworthy official response.
Ahead of Eni’s May 15, 2024 shareholders’ meeting, the company was asked directly whether it could confirm Reuters’ reported €1 billion valuation and identify the interested investors.
Eni replied that Novamont could fit its satellite strategy and emphasized its commitment to integrating Novamont into Versalis.
The published answer did not explicitly confirm the valuation or identify the investors.
That is not evidence that the reported number was false. But it means the figure should not be presented as a valuation formally endorsed by Eni.
It leaves three questions worth pursuing:
- Who originally proposed or calculated the approximately €1 billion figure?
- What earnings forecasts, debt assumptions and asset valuations supported it?
- Did any interested investor conduct due diligence and reach an agreed valuation?
The question is not whether Reuters acted improperly. Reuters reported information attributed to its sources.
The financial question is what those sources were describing: an independently supportable business valuation, an indicative negotiating price, or an ambitious expectation for a future transaction.
7. From Valuable Patents to Continuing Losses
By 2025, Novamont’s operating performance was still under pressure.
Eni’s 2025 Form 20-F reports that Novamont contributed approximately €271 million in revenue to its biochemistry business.
It also states that Novamont’s sales volumes fell 7.4% compared with 2024.
Bioplastics News previously reported that Novamont incurred a net loss of approximately €70 million in 2025, following losses in earlier years.
Those figures matter when assessing the economic prospects associated with patents, trademarks and other intangible assets.
The value of intellectual property can depend on expected future cash flows. If sales volumes fall, production remains expensive or profit forecasts deteriorate, the assumptions used in an earlier valuation may need to be reconsidered.
But subsequent losses do not automatically invalidate a valuation performed years earlier.
A company may have valuable technology while experiencing temporary losses. It may also retain strategic value to a larger industrial group even when its standalone results are disappointing.
The relevant accounting question is whether future economic benefits remain sufficiently supportable under the standards governing each asset and reporting entity.
That requires examining amortization, recoverable amounts, impairment assessments and management forecasts—not merely looking at the bottom line.
The wider context is also relevant.
Bioplastics News has previously examined a reported €195 million intercompany loan from Versalis to Novamont, highlighting questions about financing conditions and the extent to which the business depends on shareholder support.
Internal financing is not inherently unusual or improper. But it is relevant when considering whether an industrial business can sustain its operations independently and whether forecasts underlying its asset values remain credible.
The same applies to Novamont’s regulatory and legal environment. In 2025, Italy’s competition authority imposed an approximately €32 million sanction concerning alleged abuses of dominance in the market for certain bioplastic compounds, with a subsequent administrative-court ruling against the challenge to the decision.
That antitrust matter is separate from the 2020 revaluation. It does, however, form part of the commercial and regulatory background against which future earnings expectations must be assessed.
The Unanswered Questions: Valuers, Auditors and Eni
This investigation does not establish that Novamont falsified its accounts, that an independent valuer acted improperly, or that Eni or Versalis knowingly overpaid for the business.
The evidence examined does not justify those conclusions.
What it does establish is that Novamont’s intangible assets were central to a sequence of substantial financial measurements during a period of shareholder conflict, settlement negotiations, acquisition and restructuring.
The November 2023 secondary analysis attributes approximately €534 million in intangible-asset revaluations to Novamont’s 2020 accounts.
Versalis’s official 2022 accounts explicitly refer to Novamont’s earlier revaluation when explaining additional values assigned to patents and trademarks.
Versalis’s 2024 accounts disclose a finalized acquisition allocation containing €475 million in additional intangible values.
And Reuters reported a potential €1 billion enterprise valuation while Novamont was facing significant financial challenges.
None of these figures can be treated as directly interchangeable. But together they justify a closer examination of the valuation methods, assumptions and supporting documentation.
The questions for Novamont, Versalis and Eni are therefore straightforward:
Who prepared the valuations supporting Novamont’s 2020 revaluation? What assumptions supported the patent and trademark values? How did those assumptions evolve through the 2022 settlement and the 2023 takeover? And how are the relevant asset values being assessed in light of subsequent financial performance?
There is nothing inherently suspicious about owning valuable patents while losing money. Nor is there anything inherently improper about using a tax measure made available by law.
But when intellectual property becomes a major component of a company’s financial story, transparency about how it is valued becomes particularly important.
Ultimately, the central question is not simply whether Novamont was once valued at hundreds of millions—or potentially a billion—euros.
It is whether the economic expectations behind those valuations can be understood, tested and reconciled.
And, just as importantly, who ultimately received the financial benefits associated with the transactions, and who now bears the financial risks?
Editorial Note — An Investigation Still in Progress
Bioplastics News intends to obtain and examine Novamont’s complete 2020 financial statements, including the statutory auditors’ report and any available independent valuation documents relating to the revaluation of patents and trademarks.
The November 2023 analysis discussed in this article is an unfinished independent research document, not an official Novamont publication. Although it provides specific references to corporate filings, the quotations attributed to those filings have not yet been independently checked against the originals.
The publisher is also currently defending legal proceedings initiated by Eni and Novamont in Italy. Preparing that defence requires considerable time, financial resources and attention that would otherwise be available for investigative journalism.
This explains, in part, why obtaining and examining additional documentation may take time. It does not alter the evidentiary standards applied to this article.
The investigation will continue as resources permit. Bioplastics News welcomes relevant documents, corrections, clarifications and responses from Novamont, Versalis, Eni and any professionals involved in the valuation exercises.
Sources and Further Reading
Official corporate and legal sources
- Versalis, Consolidated Financial Statements 2022 — settlement and valuation disclosures:
https://www.versalis.eni.com/assets/documents/versalis/it/documentazione/bilanci/Bilancio%20Versalis%202022%20Finale.pdf - Versalis, Consolidated Financial Statements 2024 — definitive Novamont purchase price allocation:
https://versalis.eni.com/assets/documents/versalis/it/documentazione/bilanci/Bilancio_Versalis_2024.pdf - Eni, Annual Report on Form 20-F 2025:
https://www.eni.com/content/dam/enicom/documents/eng/reports/2025/ar-2025/Annual-Report-On-Form-20-F-2025.pdf - Eni, confirmation of the completed Novamont acquisition, October 18, 2023:
https://www.eni.com/en-IT/media/press-release/2023/10/versalis-acquisition-of-novamont-completed.html - Eni, shareholders’ meeting questions and answers, May 2024:
https://www.eni.com/content/dam/enicom/documents/eng/governance/shareholders-meetings/2024/AGM24-Q-A-prior-to-Shareholders-Meeting.pdf - Italian Ministry of Finance, Article 110, Decree-Law 104/2020:
https://def.finanze.it/DocTribFrontend/getAttoNormativoDetail.do?ACTION=getArticolo&articolo=Articolo+110&codiceOrdinamento=200011000000000&id=%7B44FF6276-8571-4AED-8BA1-60A271DABFA3%7D
Reuters reporting
- Eni explores sale of a Novamont stake, December 2023, Reuters report republished by MarketScreener:
https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/ENI-S-P-A-413403/news/Eni-exploring-sale-of-stake-in-bioplastic-maker-Novamont-source-says-45580764/ - Eni aims to sell stakes in biofuel and bioplastics units, April 15, 2024:
https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/eni-aims-sell-stakes-biofuel-bioplastic-units-by-year-end-sources-say-2024-04-15/
Earlier investigations by Bioplastics News
- Novamont Lost €70 Million in 2025:
https://bioplasticsnews.com/2026/07/13/novamont-lost-e70-million-in-2025/ - The Curious Economics of Novamont’s €195 Million Loan:
https://bioplasticsnews.com/2026/05/12/the-curious-economics-of-novamonts-e195-million-loan/ - The Novamont Takeover: How Losses, Litigation and Strategic Control Ended in Eni’s Hands:
https://bioplasticsnews.com/2026/04/30/the-novamont-takeover-how-losses-litigation-and-strategic-control-ended-in-enis-hands/
Additional research materials
- Novamont S.p.A. e i suoi bilanci, storia di un naufragio nel porto sicuro di Eni/Versalis, November 6, 2023, unfinished analytical draft supplied to Bioplastics News.
- Nota tecnica integrativa sulla rivalutazione degli attivi immateriali di Novamont S.p.A. e sui conseguenti effetti contabili, fiscali ed economico-patrimoniali, supplementary technical analysis supplied to Bioplastics News.
Outstanding primary documents: Novamont S.p.A.’s complete 2020 statutory accounts and attachments, specifically the Nota Integrativa, Relazione del Collegio Sindacale, external audit report and any available independent valuation reports.




