Internal meeting records reveal a coordinated campaign for restrictions on OXO-degradable plastics, efforts to oppose technical standards, and lobbying around an eventual EU-wide ban. The documents raise questions about industry influence—but do not, on their own, establish an illegal cartel.
A ban with a history
In 2019, the European Union adopted a strikingly specific prohibition. Article 5 of its Single-Use Plastics Directive barred products made from OXO-degradable plastic from being placed on the EU market. Unlike restrictions focused on particular disposable products, this measure targeted materials defined by their degradation mechanism: additives that cause plastic to break down through oxidation. [L3]
The legislation was the outcome of a political process extending over several years. Internal records from European Bioplastics (EUBP), the industry association representing producers of bio-based, biodegradable and compostable plastics, document how members campaigned against OXO materials well before the final directive. Novamont, the Italian producer of Mater-Bi compostable plastics, participated in key discussions.
The question is not whether OXO products deserved favorable treatment. It is how an industry association sought to influence the rules governing a competing plastics technology—and whether some of its proposed tactics went beyond arguing the science.
The campaign, in the industry’s own words
A European Bioplastics Product Group meeting on 25 June 2015 adopted a clear objective: the association “strongly supports an EU-wide ban of oxos.” The minutes describe the campaign as a major task for the following two years. Participants discussed reaching the European Commission, European Parliament and organizations involved in an EU study, as well as preparing material for politicians. [D1]
The attendance list names representatives of BASF, Biotec, Novamont and other organizations. Christophe Doukhi-De Boissoudy and Stefano Facco attended for Novamont. Doukhi-De Boissoudy was elected vice-chair of the Product Group at that meeting. Attendance and office-holding establish participation, not how each individual voted on every policy position.
Other records reveal the campaign’s breadth. In June 2014, a European Bioplastics meeting discussed a proposed study of OXO plastics to be financed by industry sponsors, with a possible steering committee involving funders. The record documents a proposal, not that research findings were bought or manipulated. [D2]
In June 2016, another group discussed contacting Plastics Europe to explore a “joint strategy against OXOs.” The minutes do not establish that such a partnership was subsequently implemented. [D3]
The association also developed a communications narrative around its rival. A 13 September 2016 presentation to European Bioplastics’ Communications Working Group listed “Fight freeloaders (‘oxo-degradables’)” among its messaging challenges. On the following slide, Paolo La Scola of Novamont was presented as a candidate to chair that working group. The language shows how the association framed OXO products publicly and internally; it does not establish who coined the label “OXO” or prove that La Scola authored that wording. [D9]
The standards question
The clearest document is dated 20 June 2017. Meeting minutes record that some members regarded an EU study of OXO plastics as insufficiently decisive because it did not recommend a ban. The group then agreed that development of standards for OXO materials “should be stopped right in the beginning”, reasoning that manufacturers could cite the standards even where pass/fail criteria existed. [D4]
Novamont representatives Doukhi-De Boissoudy and Facco were again listed among those attending.
This matters because technical standards are a means of establishing test methods, performance thresholds and common definitions. Disputing environmental claims is one thing; attempting to prevent a competing technology from obtaining a testing framework is another. The minutes disclose a collective position, but not evidence that a specific standard was actually blocked.
There is also an important qualification. At a separate European Bioplastics meeting in May 2017, dealing with revision of the EN 13432 compostability standard, participants decided not to exclude OXO or pro-oxidant-additive materials, stating that the standard should remain open to everyone. Those were different standardization discussions. Both records must be considered. [D5]
The campaign also addressed regulatory definitions. A June 2017 presentation described the proposed treatment of biodegradable agricultural mulch films under EU fertiliser rules, including the phrase “Passive exclusion of oxo-materials.” The presentation claimed that EUBP’s arguments had received positive reactions from Commission departments, Parliament committees and several member states. That is the association’s own account, not independent proof of official endorsement. [D6]
From metal salts to an EU-wide prohibition
The legislative trail is especially revealing, although it does not identify an external author of the eventual ban.
In April 2014, European Parliament amendments to legislation on lightweight plastic carrier bags described OXO additives as “typically metal salts” and argued against their use in plastic packaging. This wording appeared in a proposed legislative position; it was not the final Single-Use Plastics Directive. [L1]
The Commission’s original May 2018 proposal for the Single-Use Plastics Directive discussed OXO plastics in its background but did not include the eventual blanket market prohibition in its operative list. On 24 October 2018, Parliament adopted Amendments 83 and 117, expressly adding products made from OXO-degradable plastic to the proposed restrictions. [L2]
European Bioplastics’ 6 November 2018 Regulatory Affairs minutes then recorded support for Parliament’s ban. They described letters and recommendations circulated to the Council, Commission departments and parliamentary representatives, as well as an engagement program with member states. Paolo La Scola of Novamont attended the meeting; he had been elected vice-chair of the Regulatory Affairs Working Group earlier that year. [D7][D8]
The sequence is documented: industry lobbying preceded and accompanied the legislative process. It does not establish that European Bioplastics or Novamont drafted the amendment, or that their lobbying caused its adoption. Identifying its authorship and any relevant meetings with lawmakers remains a legitimate question for further reporting.
The environmental argument cannot be ignored
OXO plastics generally contain additives designed to promote oxidative degradation. Their proponents distinguish this process from simple fragmentation, arguing that oxidation can be followed by microbial biodegradation. Critics question whether sufficient biodegradation takes place in real environments and point to potential microplastic and recycling problems.
The EU’s position has also survived judicial scrutiny. In January 2024, the EU General Court dismissed a damages action brought by Symphony Environmental, a producer of additive technology affected by the ban. The Court found that the legislature had not made a manifest error in adopting the prohibition, referring to the scientific evidence available at the time. [L4]
That judgment supports the legality of the EU measure against the arguments examined in that case. It did not decide whether European Bioplastics or any member had separately engaged in anticompetitive coordination.
Novamont, Eni and commercial interests
Novamont’s participation predates its full acquisition by Eni. Through chemicals subsidiary Versalis, Eni established the Matrìca joint venture with Novamont in 2011 and held a minority stake in the company during the association meetings discussed here. Versalis reported a 25% shareholding before its 2022 restructuring; it completed the acquisition of the remaining shares on 18 October 2023. [L5][L6]
The shareholding establishes a longstanding financial relationship. It does not, without further evidence, show that Eni directed the European Bioplastics campaign. Nor do the attendance lists reviewed for the key 2015 and 2017 meetings identify Eni as a participant in its own name.
The commercial stakes are nevertheless real: competing approaches to degradability, compostability, standards and product regulation can determine which materials are eligible for particular markets. Quantifying any commercial gain from the OXO prohibition would require additional market evidence.
What competition authorities did
The internal documents were submitted to the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition on 13 April 2022, following an initial approach earlier that month. DG Competition confirmed receiving them, examined the material and, on 2 May 2022, said it considered there was insufficient basis to suspect an anticompetitive cartel or boycott. In June 2022, it explained that its limited resources, enforcement priorities and assessment of the likelihood of an infringement meant it would not pursue a full investigation. The submissions were treated as market information, not a formal Form C complaint. [C1]
A further submission was made on 4 August 2025, after an Italian antitrust decision involving Novamont. DG Competition reiterated its position in September, distinguishing the earlier allegations of coordination among industry participants from the Italian case and again referring to the formal complaint procedure. [C2]
Two Italian sanctions provide important—but distinct—context. On 24 June 2025, Italy’s competition authority, AGCM, imposed penalties totaling approximately €32.06 million on Novamont and, for a portion of the infringement, jointly on Eni. It found exclusionary practices in Italy’s markets for bioplastic raw materials used in shopping bags. Novamont disputed the decision; in April 2026, the Lazio administrative court rejected challenges, with further appeal reported. [A1][A3]
On 26 September 2025, AGCM separately fined Eni €336.21 million for participating in coordination over the bio-component of motor-fuel prices. A Lazio administrative court ruling upheld Eni’s sanction in May 2026. Novamont was not a sanctioned participant in that fuel case. [A2][A4]
Neither Italian case adjudicated the European Bioplastics campaign against OXO plastics. They should not be treated as proof that the association committed an antitrust infringement.
The unanswered question
European Bioplastics’ records establish a campaign with named participants, explicit ban objectives, proposals concerning research and standards, and extensive efforts to influence EU policy. Parliament’s records establish when a targeted prohibition entered the Single-Use Plastics Directive. Competition and judicial records establish what regulators decided—and what they did not decide.
Where should the boundary lie between legitimate scientific advocacy and coordinated efforts to deny a competing technology a fair route to testing, standardization and market access? The internal minutes make that question worth asking. Answering it conclusively would require evidence about the campaign’s implementation, commercial effects, amendment drafting and the responses of those involved.
Internal documentary sources — cited, not reproduced in full
- D1 — European Bioplastics, Product Group Biodegradables, minutes, 25 June 2015, pp. 1 and 3. Archive: `Doc 23 -EUBP_PG Biodegradables_Minutes_25th_June_2015.pdf`.
- D2 — European Bioplastics, Members Meeting, minutes, 11 June 2014, p. 5. `Doc 3 -1_MM_Minutes_140611.pdf OXO.pdf`.
- D3 — European Bioplastics, Product Group Biobased, minutes, 15 June 2016, p. 3. `Doc 19 -EUBP_PG_Biobased_Minutes_160615.pdf`.
- D4 — European Bioplastics, Product Group Biodegradables, minutes, 20 June 2017, pp. 1–2. `Doc 25 -EUBP_PG_Biodegradables_Minutes_170620.pdf`.
- D5 — European Bioplastics, EN 13432 ad hoc group, minutes, 10 May 2017, p. 3. `Doc 1 -EUBP_adhoc_EN13432_Minutes_170510.pdf`.
- D6 — European Bioplastics, members’ presentation, 21 June 2017, p. 13. `Doc 12 -EUBP_MM_presentation_170621.pdf`.
- D7 — European Bioplastics, Regulatory Affairs Working Group, minutes, 6 November 2018, pp. 1–2. `Doc 36 -EUBP_WG_REGA_minutes_meeting_181106.pdf`.
- D8 — European Bioplastics, Regulatory Affairs Working Group, minutes, 28 February 2018, p. 1. `Doc 35 -EUBP_WG_REGA_minutes_meeting_180228.pdf`.
- D9 — European Bioplastics, Communications Working Group kick-off presentation, 13 September 2016, pp. 3 and 5. `Doc 31 -EUBP_WG_Comms_kick-off_call_presentation_20160913.pdf`.
Public and official sources
- L1 — European Parliament, legislative amendments on plastic carrier bags, 16 April 2014: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014AP0417
- L2 — European Parliament, amendments 83 and 117, adopted 24 October 2018: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018AP0411
- L3 — Directive (EU) 2019/904, Articles 3 and 5: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019L0904
- L4 — EU General Court, Symphony Environmental, T-745/20, 31 January 2024: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62020TJ0745
- L5 — Versalis/Novamont ownership and joint venture, 29 March 2022: https://www.eni.com/en-IT/media/press-release/2022/03/versalis-novamont-strengthen-green-chemistry-partnership.html
- L6 — Eni/Versalis acquisition completion, 18 October 2023: https://www.eni.com/en-IT/media/press-release/2023/10/versalis-acquisition-of-novamont-completed.html
- A1 — AGCM, Novamont/Eni bioplastics case A573, 24 June 2025: https://en.agcm.it/en/media/press-releases/2025/6/A573-
- A2 — AGCM, motor-fuel price-component case I864, 26 September 2025: https://en.agcm.it/en/media/press-releases/2025/9/I864
- A3 — Novamont’s response to A573, 24 June 2025: https://novamont.it/eng/read-press-release/novamont-expresses-surprise-and-regret-over-agcm-decision-which-penalises-virtuous-system-wide-technological-innovation-by-classifying-it-as-abuse-of-dominant-position/
- A4 — ANSA, Lazio administrative court ruling on fuel cartel, 19 May 2026: https://www.ansa.it/amp/canale_motori/notizie/istituzioni/2026/05/19/tar-conferma-maximulte-a-q8-ed-eni-per-intesa-anti-concorrenza_21f9468a-1a33-4c2c-a032-e1477aea2405.html
- C1 — DG Competition correspondence, April–June 2022, source copies held in editorial archive; including replies dated 2 May and 15 June.
- C2 — DG Competition correspondence, August–September 2025, source copies held in editorial archive; including the 5 September reply.





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