Germany’s Oil Strategy During the Second World War
Germany entered the Second World War with very limited domestic crude oil reserves. To reduce its dependence on imported oil, the Nazi regime invested heavily in the production of synthetic fuels, converting coal into gasoline and diesel using the Bergius and Fischer–Tropsch processes. At its peak, synthetic fuel supplied roughly half of Germany’s liquid fuel needs.
The remaining crude oil came primarily from Romania’s Ploiești oil fields, supplemented by smaller volumes from territories under German control and, later in the war, limited supplies from Hungary. Germany never succeeded in capturing the Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus, despite the 1942 campaign toward Baku.
From 1944 onward, the Allied strategic bombing campaign systematically targeted Germany’s synthetic fuel plants and refineries. The destruction of this infrastructure caused fuel production to collapse and became one of the major logistical factors contributing to Germany’s defeat.
Rebuilding Germany’s Oil Supply After 1945
Following Germany’s defeat in 1945, the country’s synthetic fuel industry lay in ruins after years of Allied bombing. During the immediate post-war years, fuel consumption remained low as the economy struggled to recover. As West Germany’s Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) gathered pace in the early 1950s, demand for energy rose rapidly.
Rather than rebuilding a large synthetic fuel industry or investing in overseas oil exploration, West Germany turned to the international oil market. German refiners increasingly imported inexpensive crude oil from the Middle East—primarily Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait—through the major international oil companies, including BP, Shell, Esso, Mobil, and Gulf. By the mid-1950s, imported Middle Eastern crude had become the foundation of West Germany’s energy supply.
Germany’s International Oil Companies: Limited Global Reach
Following the Second World War, Germany did not establish a large international oil company capable of securing significant crude oil reserves abroad. Instead, a small number of companies gradually expanded their exploration and production activities overseas, although their international footprint remained modest compared with the major European oil companies.
- DEA – Deutsche Erdöl AG (1899): Germany’s oldest dedicated oil company and the country’s leading exploration and production firm. Beginning in the 1960s, DEA expanded beyond Germany into Norway, Libya, Egypt, the North Sea and later the Caspian region. Despite this international presence, DEA remained a mid-sized exploration company and never ranked among the world’s major integrated oil producers.
- Wintershall (1894): Originally a mining company, Wintershall entered oil and gas exploration in the 1930s. From the 1960s onward, it steadily expanded internationally, developing upstream operations in Libya, Argentina, the North Sea, Russia and the Middle East. By the 2000s, it had become Germany’s largest internationally active exploration and production company.
- Preussag (1923): Although primarily a mining and industrial conglomerate, Preussag invested in oil and gas exploration during the post-war decades, particularly in the North Sea. The company eventually withdrew from the energy sector and transformed itself into the tourism group TUI.
- VEBA (1929): VEBA entered the upstream oil business through acquisitions during the 1960s and 1970s, notably via Gelsenberg and VEBA Oel. While it acquired exploration assets in Germany and abroad, upstream production remained only one component of its broader industrial and energy portfolio.
By the end of the twentieth century, Germany possessed several internationally active exploration and production companies. However, none controlled large overseas oil reserves or developed into a globally dominant upstream producer. Germany’s energy security continued to depend primarily on access to international crude oil markets rather than on ownership of oil resources abroad.
What Happened to Germany’s Oil Companies?
From the 1990s onward, Germany’s upstream oil industry underwent a profound transformation. Rather than growing into global energy champions, most German oil companies were merged, acquired, or redirected into other sectors.
- DEA was acquired by RWE in 2002. In 2019, it merged with Wintershall to form Wintershall DEA, creating Germany’s largest exploration and production company. In 2024, most of Wintershall DEA’s exploration and production business was sold to Harbour Energy, effectively ending German ownership of its largest international upstream company.
- Wintershall, once Germany’s flagship exploration and production company, became part of Wintershall DEA before most of its international assets were transferred to Harbour Energy.
- VEBA merged with VIAG in 2000 to form E.ON. During the restructuring that followed, its oil business (VEBA Oel) was sold to BP in 2002, marking the end of VEBA’s involvement in the international oil industry.
- Preussag gradually exited the energy sector during the 1990s and reinvented itself as TUI, one of the world’s largest tourism companies.
Today, Germany no longer owns a major internationally active upstream oil company. While German firms continue to participate in the global energy sector through engineering, chemicals, equipment manufacturing and energy trading, the exploration and production of crude oil abroad is no longer a significant part of Germany’s industrial landscape.
An Energy Order That Left Little Room for Germany
Viewed through a geopolitical lens, post-war Germany inherited an energy system in which the rules had already been written. The international crude oil market was dominated by the Seven Sisters, while West Germany was being rebuilt as an export-oriented industrial economy firmly integrated into the Western alliance. In such an environment, Germany was encouraged to excel in manufacturing, engineering and technology—not to emerge as an independent global competitor in the strategic business of securing oil reserves.
Whether this outcome resulted from deliberate policy or simply from the economic realities of the time remains open to debate. Yet the effect was unmistakable: Germany became one of the world’s largest consumers of crude oil without ever controlling significant oil resources abroad. Access to energy depended not on ownership, but on participation in an international market largely shaped by foreign oil majors.
One could therefore argue that Germany traded energy sovereignty for economic integration. As long as crude oil remained abundant and inexpensive, this appeared to be a rational bargain. But every oil crisis—from 1973 to the present day—has served as a reminder that countries which do not control strategic resources ultimately depend on those that do.
Oil and Natural Gas: Two Different German Strategies
Germany followed two distinct approaches to securing its fossil energy supplies. In crude oil, it relied primarily on the international market, importing inexpensive oil from producing countries while never developing a globally significant upstream industry capable of securing large overseas reserves.
Natural gas followed a different path. Rather than focusing on ownership of gas fields, Germany invested in long-term supply relationships, cross-border pipelines, storage facilities and gas trading infrastructure. Companies such as Ruhrgas, Wintershall and later E.ON became key players in transporting and marketing natural gas, while Germany evolved into Europe’s principal gas distribution hub.
In retrospect, these strategies reveal two different interpretations of energy security. In oil, Germany trusted the global market. In natural gas, it sought security through infrastructure and long-term partnerships. Both models delivered decades of economic success, but both also proved vulnerable to geopolitical disruption. The lesson is that true energy security depends not only on access to resources, but also on maintaining a meaningful degree of strategic influence over how those resources are produced, transported and delivered.
Conclusion
It is time for Europe to put an end to its energy dysfunction. One way to achieve this would be to create a German national champion in crude oil and natural gas exploration and production—one capable of securing strategic energy resources abroad and strengthening Europe’s long-term energy sovereignty.
Satirical Note – A Completely Fictional Interview with the German Chancellor
The interview below never took place, the quotes are entirely fictional, and any resemblance to real politicians is purely coincidental. Or perhaps just politically inconvenient.
German Chancellor: Mr. Barrett, your proposal to create a German crude oil and natural gas exploration company sounds interesting on paper, but it wouldn’t work in reality. Besides, it could disrupt the global oil market.
Mr. Barrett: Mr. Chancellor, does it look to you as if I give a fuck about disrupting the oil market?
(A brief silence.)
Mr. Barrett: Have you read the news lately?
German Chancellor: Well… yes.
Mr. Barrett: Then you’ll have noticed that the oil market seems perfectly capable of disrupting itself.
German Chancellor: But Germany has relied on global markets for decades.
Mr. Barrett: Exactly. And how’s that strategy working out?
German Chancellor: We are… reviewing it.
Mr. Barrett: Ah yes. Europe’s favorite energy source: reviews, consultations and impact assessments.
German Chancellor: We believe in rules-based markets.
Mr. Barrett: Don’t you believe in owning at least part of the well before someone else owns all of it?
German Chancellor: You’re oversimplifying a very complex geopolitical issue.
Mr. Barrett: No. I’m simplifying it. The geopolitics are already complicated enough.
German Chancellor: So you’re seriously suggesting that Germany build a globally active exploration and production company?
Mr. Barrett: No.
German Chancellor: No?
Mr. Barrett: I’m suggesting Germany should have built one thirty years ago. Today, you’re just late.
German Chancellor: One last question… what would you call this new German oil company?
Mr. Barrett: Drill, Baby, Drill.